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THE NEW YORK JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1976:
RESTRICTIVE PLACEMENT-AN ANSWER TO THE
PROBLEM OF THE SERIOUSLY VIOLENT YOUTH?
Society has grappled with the question of its problem children for most of its
history,' and public concern over juvenile crime is a perennially recurrent
theme. 2 Recently, however, a new, more fearful note has emerged. Where it
once meant property offenses like vandalism and car theft, "juvenile delin-
quency" more and more conjures up images of serious personal violence. 3 The
mass media carries the message of a newer, tougher juvenile, more dangerous,
and committing more violent crimes, than ever before. For example, the New
York Times reports that in New York City in 1975, 54 youths under sixteen
were arrested for murder, 5,276 for robbery, 1,230 for felonious assault, 173 for
rape, 125 for sodomy; 4 and that 83% of all those arrested in Nassau County in
1973-74 for major crimes were youths. 5 Seemingly indifferent and remorseless
fourteen and fifteen year-olds prey on the elderly6 and murder passers-by7 and
each other8 with callous casualness in between brief visits to the Family Court. 9
The courts and treatment centers are portrayed as incapable of handling
effectively the most dangerous offenders.' 0 Similar, if more restrained, reports
appear in professional publications. 1 The net result is a public perception of a
vast increase in violent juvenile crime and of almost total failure of the present
techniques for dealing with the threat. 12
Whether this is an accurate perception is the subject of debate. In a recent
article, 13 one authority cited arrest figures to show that the actual incidence of
1. A Seventeenth Century guide to British Justices of the Peace advised that "[ain infant of
eight yeares of age, or above, may commit homicide, and shall be hanged for it. . .. " W. Sanders,
Juvenile Offenders for a Thousand Years 11 (1970). In the Nineteenth Century, despite numerous
attempts at ameliorative treatment not unlike those engendered by modern philosophy, [see id. at
113-66] British children were transported to Australia or confined in rotting prison ships. Id. at
69-70.
2. One commentator writing in the mid-50's noted that every ten years we have hysteria
about juvenile delinquents. Sharp, Jails or Detention Homes for Children?, in Youth and Crime
182 (F. Cohen ed. 1957).
3. Treaster, Juvenile Criminals an Increasing Problem, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at 22, col.
1.
4. Id., col. 2.
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1976, Long Island §, at 1 (L.I. ed.).
6. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
7. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
8. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1976, at B2, col. 1.
9. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, at 42, col. 4.
10. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1976, at 1, col. 7.
11. See notes 13 & 14 infra and accompanying text.
12. Family Court Judge Simeon Golar expressed these views in an open letter to the mayor,
resigning his post. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1976, at 37, col. 5.
13. Guggenheim, Juvenile Justice and the 'Violent' Offender, 175 N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1976, at
1, col. 2. [hereinafter cited as Guggenheim].
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serious violent crime among the under-sixteen age group was relatively
insignificant. A subsequent article by another authority on the New York
situation cited the serious effect of youthful violence on the most frequent
victims--the poor, the elderly, the working-class urban-dweller-to refute
claims that the problem was exaggerated. 14 But however accurate or inaccu-
rate, the public perception of a threat to its safety is a reality, already translated
into pressure for change in the way the law treats serious juvenile offenders. Is
Today's public is demanding protection of the community from its violent
children. 16
The New York Legislature, in an attempt to deal more effectively with the
juvenile who commits a serious violent offense without surrendering him to the
adult criminal system,17 has enacted the New York Juvenile Justice Reform
Act of 1976.18 This Note will examine the Act in an attempt to evaluate
whether these goals are likely to be effectuated.
DEVELOPMENT AND BACKGROUND OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Although differences exist among the various state schemes, the underlying
theory and basic elements are universal enough to justify reference to a single
Juvenile Justice System 19 in this county-a system whose hallmarks are the
separate treatment of juveniles and adult offenders, a focus on the offender
rather than the offense, and an emphasis on rehabilitation rather than
punishment. 20 This system came into being in the latter part of the last century
as a result of a wave of social reform that swept the nation,21 and in reaction to
the harshness of the then current laws that treated adult criminals and
14. Dembitz, Dangerously Violent Juvenile Delinquents, 175 N.Y.L.J., June 24, 1976, at 1,
col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Dembitz-N.Y.L.J.].
15. Treaster, Juvenile Criminals an Increasing Problem, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at 22, col.
1.
16. This is in sharp contrast to eighty years ago, when the public's perception of inequities in
the way the law dealt with troubled and troublesome children brought about drastic changes for the
protection of the child. See text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
17. In its report, the legislative committee that investigated the operation of the juvenile justice
system in New York stated: "The concept of a separate juvenile justice system remains valid. The
adult criminal justice system is totally unprepared and ill-equipped to contend with the special
problems posed by juvenile offenders. However, it is clear that major changes are needed.... The
most obvious need for change is in the treatment of serious, violent offenders." N.Y. State
Assembly Standing Comm. on Child Care, 199th Sess., Juvenile Crime 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Gottfried Report].
18. Law of July 26, 1976, N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. - (McKinney 1976) [hereinafter cited as the
Act].
19. For examples of the standard use of the phrase, see T. Johnson, Introduction to the
Juvenile Justice System (1975) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]; S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles: The
Juvenile Justice System (1974) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; Juvenile Justice Philosophy (F. Faust &
P. Brantingham ed. 1974) [this collection is hereinafter cited as Faust].
20. Johnson, supra note 19, at 6.
21. Lou, The Spirit of Social Justice, in The Problems of Juvenile Courts and the Rights of
Children 7-8 (11. Paulsen ed.) (1975i [this collection is hereinafter cited as Paulsen].
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delinquent children alike.2 2 The reformers hoped "that the child who has begun
to go wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a law. . . [will) be taken in
hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a protector, as the ultimate
guardian .... -23 Thus the state became the benevolent parent providing for
the needs of its children, a concept that guided the formulation of the first
juvenile court system in Chicago in 189924 and of those that quickly followed
across the country. 25
Although it was originally believed that the special nature of the juvenile
process required the suspension of constitutional safeguards in order to be most
beneficial to the child,26 this proved in practice to be a major flaw. 27 It left the
juvenile vulnerable to arbitrary treatment often far harsher than that dealt out
to adults, 28 without the adult's ready recourse to redress through appeal, 29
while failing to provide the rehabilitation and protection for which his
constitutional rights were presumably exchanged. 30 As a result of a series of
successful challenges 31 to this practice in recent years, the juvenile offender
22. Id. at 6-10; Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 106 (1909). There Is,
however, some evidence that children were not, in fact, treated so harshly as the laws decreed: the
very inflexibility of the rules led juries to acquit and judges to dismiss in cases where children would
otherwise suffer adult penalties. Sanders, Some Early Beginnings of the Children's Court
Movement in England, in Faust, supra note 19, at 42. A fairly complex system of alternative
measures grew up to avoid the strictures of the adult rules. Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court,
18 Crime & Delinquency 68, 78 (1972).
23. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 107 (1909).
24. Johnson, supra note 19, at 3.
25. Id. at 3-5.
26. F. Faust & P. Brantingham, The Era of the 'Socialized' Juvenile Court-1899 to 1967, in
Faust, supra note 19, at 146. "To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a
career of crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the legislature surely
may provide for the salvation of such a child ... by bringing it into one of the courts of the state
without any process at all ...." Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
"It would be carrying the protection of 'inalienable rights,' guaranteed by the Constitution, a long
ways to say that that guaranty extends to a free and unlimited exercise of the whims, caprices, or
proclivities of . . . a child . . . for idleness, ignorance, crime, indigence, or any kindred
dispositions or inclinations." Ex parte Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 129-30, 96 P. 563, 565 (1908).
27. M. Paulsen, Children's Court: Gateway or Last Resort?, in Paulsen, supra note 21, at
108-09. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. For example, Gerald Gault was sentenced to six years for what would have earned an adult
a fine of five to fifty dollars or two months in prison. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1967).
29. The Arizona law which controlled the Gault case did not permit appeal in juvenile cases.
Id. at 8. In other cases, the paucity of appeals may be due to the parents' acceptance of the court's
order through indifference, despair, or lack of advice of counsel. Dembitz, Ferment and
Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in the New Family Court, 48 Cornell L.Q. 499, 503-04 &
n.21. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Dembitz-Cornell].
30. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society 79-88 (1967).
31. The sequence of cases from Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541(1966), to In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), has been dealt with at great length In the
standard treatments of the juvenile system. See, e.g., Faust, supra note 19, at 356-420.
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now enjoys most of the procedural protections of an adult accused of a crime. 32
In New York, the juvenile being processed through the separate juvenile
system was entitled to procedural due process at the adjudicatory phase even
before the Supreme Court required it.
3 3
THE NEW YORK JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The New York juvenile justice system, as embodied in the Family Court Act
(FCA) passed in 1962, 34 might be more accurately termed a family justice
system, since juveniles under sixteen are handled exclusively by the Family
Court, even when accused of criminal offenses. 35 The original intent was to
focus on individual and family needs rather than on traditional legal culpabil-
ity, and to that end a single court was created to have jurisidiction over the
many, varied situations of family relationships that traditionally were spread
over a number of civil and criminal courts-paternity actions, intra-family
disputes, and juvenile cases. With a viewpoint that was as much social as legal,
the Family Court tried to resolve the problems of the whole person by viewing
him in the context of his social setting and relationships rather than as an
individual to be punished for a specific offense. 36
The system presently operates as follows. When a juvenile offender (in New
York, a person between seven and sixteen charged with an offense that if
committed by an adult would be a crime)37 is arrested, the case goes to the
Intake Bureau of the Probation Department. A majority of the cases are
"adjusted" here, i.e., charges are dropped, the child is referred to a community
program or residential facility, or placed on probation. 38 If not "adjusted," a
petition is filed against the child (the respondent). This decision is usually made
by a court officer but an insistent complainant can have a petition filed where
Intake has recommended otherwise. 39 Pending adjudication, which occurs in
the fact-finding hearing, the child can be placed in detention or released. There
32. I.e., the right to sufficient written notice of charges, to counsel, to the privilege against
self-incrimination and to the confrontation of witnesses but not to a jury trial. McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). However, in other areas, such as school locker searches,
juveniles still are not afforded full due process protection. For a thorough discussion of this area,
see Note, Public School Searches and Seizures, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 202 (1976).
33. The drafters of the Family Court Act of 1962 expressed a determination "to provide ... due
process of law . . . [and] affirms the traditional role of the courts in reviewing under the
constitution the application of the law .... Report of the Joint Legislative Committ 'e on Court
Reorganization, the Family Court Act, N.Y. Session Laws 3437 (McKinney 1962). The Supreme
Court favorably cited the New York statute several times in its opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 40, 48, 55 n.96, 57 (1967).
34. N.Y. Family CL Act (McKinney 1975) [hereinafter cited as FCA].
35. The Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles. FCA § 713. Persons under 16
are not criminally responsible for their conducL N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (McKinney 1975).
36. Dembitz-Cornell, supra note 29, at 500-01.
37. FCA § 712(a), as amended, the Act § 3.
38. FCA § 734(a)(ii); Dembitz-Cornell, supra note 29, at 514.
39. FCA § 734(b).
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are, however, detailed criteria for detention 40 which tend to encourage release
in most situations. 4 1
The fact-finding hearing is held before a Family Court judge to determine
"whether the respondent did the act or acts alleged in the petition .... "42 This
hearing, comparable to the trial of an adult offender, is ringed about with all
the procedural protections except a jury trial. 43 The county attorney acts as
"counsel for the petitioner," since this is considered a civil matter.44
If the child is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, i.e., found to have
committed the acts alleged in the petition, 45 a separate dispositional hearing is
held "to determine whether the respondent requires supervision, treatment or
confinement. '46 The child, his law guardian, and the Probation Department
participate, but usually not counsel for the petitioner. To aid him in his
decision, the judge will have the background reports and recommendations of
the Probation Department.4 7 Any evidence relevant to the issue of a child's
welfare is admissible because it is felt that the judge should know as much as
possible about the child and those factors in his background that led to his
40. On taking a child into custody, a police officer has a choice of releasing the child, taking
him to Family Court or to a detention facility but, "([in the absence of special circumstances," he is
directed to release the child. FCA § 724(c). Before a petition is filed, a child taken into custody on a
charge of juvenile delinquency should be released from detention facilities unless there are "special
circumstances requiring his detention." FCA § 727(b). After a hearing and before the filing of a
petition the judge shall order the release of the child "unless there is a substantial probability that he
will not appear in court on the return date or unless there is a serious risk that he may before [that
date] do an act which if committed by an adult would be a crime." FCA § 728(b)(iii). After the filing
of a petition and prior to an order of disposition, the child shall be released unless there is a
substantial probability that he will not appear or a serious risk that before the return date he
would do an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime. FCA § 739.
41. The drafters of the FCA indicated that they intended to "avoid as much as possible any
deprivation of liberty without a judicial order," Committee Comments to FCA § 727 (McKinney
1975) and "any routine detention of a child." Committee Comments to FCA § 739 (McKlnney
1975).
42. FCA § 742.
43. "[A]t the commencement of any hearing under this article, the respondent . . . shall be
advised of [his] right to remain silent and of his right to be represented by counsel chosen by him or
his parent . . . or by a law guardian assigned by the court . . . ." FCA § 741.
On May 25, 1976, the legislature amended FCA § 744(b) to comply with previous court rulings
on the quantum of evidence required for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency. In re Winshlip,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and Ivan V. v. City of N.Y., 407
U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam) applied this ruling retroactively. Thus New York has dropped the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard and replaced it with "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
Law of May 25, 1976, § 1, N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 191 (McKinney 1976), amending FCA § 744(b).
44. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, The Family Court
Act, in N.Y. Session Laws §§ 3433-34 (McKinney 1962); D. Besharov, Practice Commentary to
N.Y. Family Court Act § 711 at 549 (McKinney 1975) [hereinafter cited as Practice Commentary].
45. "If the allegations ... are established ... the court shall enter an order finding that the
respondent is a juvenile delinquent ..... FCA § 752.
46. FCA § 743.
47. Even though not required by law, such reports are standard court procedure. D. Besharov,
Juvenile Justice Advocacy 393 (1974).
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offense, including information that may help or hinder treatmenL48 Since such
open-ended standards allow for the possibility that inaccurate or biased
information will be included,49 the respondent has the right to challenge the
reports and to produce counter evidence at the dispositional hearing."0
There are several options open to the judge. The child can be put on
probation or given suspended judgment, with various conditions."1 Further,
the offender can be placed in foster care with the Division for Youth, the Social
Services Department, or a local agency. S2 Such a "placement" is for eighteen
months, extendable year-by-year until the child reaches the age of eighteen
(twenty-one with the child's consent),S3 but he can be released or discharged at
any time at the discretion of the Division for Youth. S4 The child can also be
transferred to the Department of Mental Hygiene if it should be found that he
has a mental illness "likely to result in serious harm to himself or others." ss He
can be "committed" instead of "placed" for up to three years, S6 with no
provision for extending the commitment and release possible at any time.
The only special provision in the present law for particularly violent
juveniles is applicable only to those who, while fifteen, commit what would be
a class A or B felony. These juveniles can be committed for three years to an
adult correctional facility.5 7
The System in Operation
In In re Gault,58 Justice Fortas warned against assuming "any necessarily
close correspondence [of the ideal] to the realities of court and institutional
48. The standard of evidence set by § 745(a) is "material and relevant," unlike that set for the
fact-finding hearing as "competent, material and relevant." FCA § 744(a) (emphasis added). In
practice a wide range of sources is used. Davis, supra note 19, at 150.
49. D. Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy at 394, 396 (1974); Dembitz-Cornell, supra note
29, at 517-19.
50. In re Cecilia R., 36 N.Y.2d 317, 327 N.E.2d 812, 367 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1975).
51. The conditions are to be set by the court from the list of permissable terms and conditions
defined by the Rules of the Family Court. They include such terms as: obeying all lawful
commands of parents; attending school or a job regularly; and keeping away from bad company.
N.Y. Court Rules § 2506.6 (McKinney 1975).
52. FCA § 756(a).
53. FCA § 756(b), (c).
54. Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2, col. 1.
55. FCA § 760(a).
56. FCA § 758. Although no explicit distinction is made in the FCA between "placement" and
"commitment," the general practice of reserving the latter for the more serious offenses, and the
terminology of § 758, emphasizing commitment to "an institution suitable for the commitment of a
delinquent child," a reference lacking in § 756(a), tends to indicate that commitment is to be used
for the more difficult cases.
57. FCA § 758(b), repealed by the Act § 18. Class A felonies include first and second degree
murder, first degree kidnapping and first degree arson. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25, .27, 135.25,
150.20. Class B felonies are first degree manslaughter, rape, sodomy, burglary, criminal mischief,
second degree kidnapping, and arson. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20, 130.35, .50, 135.20, 140.30,
145.12, 150.15 (McKinney 1975). Males can be committed to Elmira Reception Center and females
to Westfield State Farm. Notes to Decisions, Practice Commentary, supra note 44, at 662-63.
58. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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routines."5 9 The weaknesses of the New York system in operation are a case in
point. Legislative investigators found it ineffective and chaotic throughout,
plagued by uncoordinated and ill-informed decision-making from Intake
through Release. They reported that "[yiouths arrested may be sent home, with
probation and the court unaware of the existence or seriousness of other
pending charges."'60 In many cases, the various witnesses and officers who had
dealt with a child involved in a serious offense had never communicated with
each other. 61 Excessive delays and adjournments discouraged all but the most
persistent complainants and witnesses. 62 Frequently, a decision was made
without a lawyer in the court to represent the community's interest. 63 Massive
cuts in funds, understaffing, and numbing caseloads in Probation resulted in
inadequate investigations and perfunctory reports to the court. 64 The judge
who decided on the disposition was often not the judge who presided at any
other hearing in the case. 65
Juvenile delinquency cases are heard along with other family cases, so the
court "never gets a chance to focus on the problem of juvenile crime on a
coherent basis."'66 No one agency has ultimate responsibility for coordinating
available programs and for concentrating these resources on the most serious
problems. 67 As a result, vital decisions were being made without adequate
information about the child, his offense, or available dispositions. Hence
"many serious or repeat offenders [were] not [being] identified or treated as
such."6
Further, once a disposition has been made by the court, it is subject to
change at the total discretion of the Division for Youth. 69 Release procedures in
the Division were found to be chaotic. Juveniles were frequently released only
because the space was needed for new arrivals, or because they were so violent
they became a serious disruption to the facility, and so were released into the
streets.
70
In many cases, investigation and other evaluative reports were not transmit-
ted to the agency for several months after the youth himself had arrived. This
made it virtually impossible for the agency to construct a meaningful rehabilita-
59. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30, quoting Wheeler & Cottrel, in Juvenile Delinquency-Its
Prevention and Control 35 (1966).
60. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 5.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 5; N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, at 42, col. 6.
63. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 5.
64. Id.; The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Joint Report Concerning Proposed
Restrictive Dispositions for Certain Children Under 16 Found to Have Committed Designated
Felony Acts [hereinafter cited as Joint Report] at 20.
65. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 5.
66. Id. at 6. This result, ironically, is an outgrowth of the attempt to deal more effectively with
these problems by bringing them together in one court. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
67. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 6.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2, col. 1.
70. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 7; Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2, col. 3.
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tive plan, or to make intelligent decisions as to release. 7' The legislative
committee concluded that major changes were needed to deal effectively with
juvenile offenders, and recommended measures which were incorporated into
the Act."12
A SYNOPSIS OF THE NEW ACT
Designated by its sponsors in the State Legislature as "[a]n act to amend the
family court act, the executive law, the education law, and the mental hygiene
law, and repealing certain provisions thereof, in relation to juvenile justice
reform, '73 the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 deals almost exclusively
with the delinquent juvenile, 74 making only a passing reference to the juvenile
in need of supervision.75 It is principally concerned with creating a new method
of dealing with the seriously violent juvenile, and most of its provisions are
directly aimed at that end.7 6
Section 2 amends the purpose of the Family Court Act (FCA) to require that
in any proceeding, the court shall consider the need for protection of the
community as well as the needs and best interests of the child.7 7
Section 3 collects the definitions of the FCA in one section,7 8 and adds four
new terms. "Designated felony act" (DFA) is defined as an act committed by a
14 or 15 year-old which, if done by an adult, would be (i) first degree murder;
second degree murder; first degree kidnapping; first degree arson; or (ii) first
degree assault; first degree manslaughter; first degree rape; first degree
sodomy, second degree kidnapping "where the abduction involved the use or
threat of use of deadly physical force"; second degree arson; first degree
robbery; or (iii) an attempt to commit murder in the first or second degree; or
kidnapping in the first degree. 7 9 "Designated class A felony act" is defined as
a designated felony act included in (i) of the above definition.8 0 "Secure
71. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 7.
72. Id. at 2-4.
73. The Act at 1.
74. A juvenile delinquent means a person between seven and sixteen years of age who
commits an act which, if done by an adult, would be a crime. FCA § 712(a).
75. A person in need of supervision is a male less than sixteen and a female less than eighteen
who does not attend school in accordance with the education law, "or who is incorrigible,
ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful
authority." FCA § 712(b).
76. Specifically, they aim at tighter court control of the processing and dispositions of such
juvenile offenders. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 2.
77. The original purpose of the FCA was to provide "due process of law (a) for considering a
claim that a person is a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision and (b) devising an
appropriate order of disposition. ... FCA § 711(a). The Act adds to this: -In any juvenile
delinquency proceeding under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of
the respondent as well as the need for protection of the community." The Act § 2, amending FCA §
711(a).
78. The Act § 3, amending FCA § 712.
79. The Act § 3, adding FCA § 712(h).
80. The Act § 3, adding FCA § 712(i).
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facility" is one which is characterized by "physically restricting construction,
hardware and procedures, and is designated as a secure facility by the
division for youth." 81 "Restrictive placement" is a placement pursuant to the
provisions of the new section 753-a. 82
Section 4 amends section 731 of the FCA to require that "designated felony
act petition" shall be prominently marked on all such petitions, and shall not be
stricken unless the allegations are withdrawn or dismissed.8 3
Section 6 amends section 734(a)(ii) of the FCA to provide that there can be no
adjustment at Intake of a designated felony act petition without the written
approval of a judge of the court (rather than the local probation director).8 4
Section 985 creates two new sections of the FCA to replace those repealed by
sections 786 and 8.87 New section 742 provides that the judge who presides at
the beginning of the fact-finding hearing shall continue to preside through the
end of the proceedings, unless circumstances prevent it.A8 The second of these
new sections, FCA section 743, mandates that counsel for the petitioner receive
written prior notice of all dispositional hearings and the opportunity to
participate therein, including the right "to present evidence of available
resources and to be heard regarding the availability and advisability of each
dispostion provided for by law." 89
Section 10 repeals section 746 of the FCA, which is related to the sequence of
the hearings and the availability of probation reports. 90
Section 11 amends section 748 of the FCA by requiring that the reasons for
any adjournment of the fact-finding hearing in a DFA case shall be stated on
the record. 91 Section 12 amends section 749 by barring the court from ordering
an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, and by limiting other adjourn-
ments to one, of up to thirty days, if the respondent is detained. 92
Section 13 creates a new section 750 of the FCA, dealing in detail with the
content and availability of probation reports.9 3 Section 750(1) provides that the
reports shall be confidential and disclosed only according to law. Further, the
reports shall not be furnished to the court before the completion of the
fact-finding hearing and the entering of a finding that the respondent is a
81. The Act § 3, adding FCA § 7120).
82. The Act § 3, adding FCA § 712(k).
83. The Act § 4, adding FCA § 731(2).
84. The Act § 6, amending FCA § 734(a)(ii).
85. The Act § 9, adding FCA §§ 742-43.
86. The Act § 7, repealing FCA § 742. § 3 of the Act defines the fact-finding hearing. This has
been moved to FCA § 712(f) by § 3 of the Act.
87. § 8 of the Act repealed FCA § 743, defining the dispositional hearing. This has been moved
to FCA § 712(g) by § 3 of the Act.
88. The Act § 9, adding FCA § 742.
89. The Act § 9, adding FCA § 743.
90. FCA § 746 has been substantially replaced by new FCA § 750(1), which was created by § 13
of the Act.
91. The Act § 11, amending FCA § 748.
92. The Act § 12, amending FCA §§ 749(d)(i), (ii).
93. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750.
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juvenile delinquent, and shall be used only at a dispositional hearing.94 New
section 750(2) allows the reports to be made available to the respondent and his
counsel and to counsel for the petitioner. 95 Except in a DFA case, the court
may except some parts from disclosure, but this must be noted on the record,
along with reasons, and may be challenged. 96
The new section deals with cases where the juvenile has been found to have
committed a DFA. 97 It requires a probation investigation and diagnostic
assessment that must include the history of the juvenile and his family,
including .past psychological and psychiatric reports, school adjustment, and
any assistance provided by public or private agencies. An in-depth study of his
mental and emotional status, including the nature and intensity of his impulses
and controls, and of situational factors that may have contributed to his
actions, must also be made. 98 Expert opinion on the risk presented to himself
and others shall be included where feasible. 99 Section 750(4) provides that these
reports are to be available to the court, counsel for respondent, and counsel for
petitioner no less than five court days prior to the dispositional hearing. "The
respective attorneys . . . have the right to examine the makers of all such
[reports]... [and] to an adjournment for a reasonable time in order to produce
additional evidence . . . ."10
Section 14 amends section 752 by requiring that the order finding the
juvenile a delinquent shall state the facts upon which the finding is based and
that section of the penal law under which the act or acts would have been a
crime. 01 Further, "[i]f the [juvenile] is found to have committed a designated
felony act, the order shall so state.1 10 2
Section 16 renumbers section 753-a' 0 3 of the FCA and creates a new 753-a,
the heart of the Act, that provides for the mandated minimum restrictive
placement of those juveniles who have committed the serious and violent
offenses listed in section 3.104
Section 753-a
Once it is determined that the juvenile has committed the DFA, the judge
must decide, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, 0 5 whether or not a
restrictive placement is required. That decision must be grounded on the
94. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750(1).
95. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750(2).
96. Id.
97. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750(3).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750(4).
101. The Act § 14, amending FCA § 752.
102. Id.
103. The Act § 16 renumbers FCA § 753-a to FCA § 753-b.
104. The Act § 3; see text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
105. This standard remains true for the dispositional hearing. The Gault court indicated that
the requirements of due process it was imposing on the adjudicatory phase did not necessarily apply
to the dispositional phase as well. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
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following criteria: "(a) the needs and best interests of the respondent; (b) the
record and background of the respondent... ; (c) the nature and circumstances
of the offense . . . ; and (d) the need for protection of the community."'' 0 6 The
judge must make specific written findings as to each of these elements within
twenty days of the close of the dispositional hearing.1 0 7 Should he find that no
restrictive placement is necessary, the entire range of dispositions provided for
in sections 753(a)-(d) of the FCA is available.' 0 8 Should he find that a
restrictive placement is required, the provisions of sections 753-a(3) and (4) go
into effect. 10 9
Section 753-a(3) mandates that when a restrictive placement is required for
one who has committed a class A DFA, he shall be placed with the Division for
Youth for an initial period of five years, the first year to be spent in a secure
facility and the second in a residential facility. He may not be released or
transferred during this two-year period.1" 0 No motion for a new hearing or to
stay the execution of, arrest, set aside, modify, or vacate the order of
disposition may be made or granted pursuant to part six of the FCA Article 7
for the first year, except as provided for in section 440. 10 of the Criminal
Procedure Law. "' The juvenile may not be released after the initial two-year
period without written approv'al of the director or deputy director of the
Division for Youth." 12 He may not be discharged from the Division's custody
except by court order which cannot be sought for three years."13 He "shall be
subject to intensive supervision whenever not in a secure or residential
facility,"1 4 written reports shall be made to the court by the Division for Youth
every six months, and, after a hearing, the placement may be extended, year by
year until the respondent's twenty-first birthday." 15
Where the DFA was not a class A offense, the restrictive placement shall be
for three years, the first six to twelve months in a residential facility. 1 6 The
other terms are substantially the same as for a class A DFA. Thus the juvenile
may not be released or transferred during the initial period; no motion pursuant
to part six 1 17 may be made, heard, or granted during the first six months of
106. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(2).
107. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(1).
108. Id. For those dispositions, see text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
109. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(1).
110. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(3)(a).
Ill. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(3)(b). § 440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law
permits the judgment to be vacated when it was illegally or unfairly obtained, or where new
evidence not previously discoverable has come to light. N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law (McKinney 1975).
112. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(3)(c)(i).
113. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(3)(c)(iii). FCA § 764 permits a parent or guardian to
petition the court for an order terminating placement or commitment upon a showing that they
have made application to the agency holding the child and have been denied. § 20 of the Act adds to
these provisions a line excluding DFA cases. The Act § 20, amending FCA §§ 764(a), (b).
114. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(3)(c)(ii).
115. The Act § 16, adding FCA §§ 753-(a)(3)(c), (d).
116. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(4)(a).
117. FCA §§ 761 et seq. See notes 111 & 113 supra and accompanying text.
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placement; he may not be released without written approval; he will be subject
to intensive supervision whenever not in a residential facility; written reports
will be made every six months; and the placement may be extended until age
twenty-one. 18
In both DFA and class A DFA situations, the court may make an order
under section 760,119 dealing with respondents who are mentally ill and likely
to do serious harm to themselves or others. The juvenile may be transferred to
the temporary custody of the Department of Mental Hygiene for care and
treatment while continuing to be under the restrictive placement of the Division
for Youth.
120
Section 22 of the Act amends section 254 of the FCA to provide that, where a
DFA has been alleged, the district attorney and the county attorney may enter
into an agreement for the temporary assignment of assistant district attorneys
to the county attorney or corporation counsel for the purpose of presenting the
juvenile delinquency petition. 121
Section 27 amends Executive Law section 523 to bar release from the
Division for Youth except as pursuant to section 753-a of the FCA.1 22
Other sections of the Act provide for transfer "forthwith" of the court order,
of probation reports and "all other relevant evaluative records" to the
institution or agency in which a child is placed or committed; 2 3 for the
development of standards 124 and regulations 125 for restrictive placement
facilities; and for cooperation among the Division for Youth, the Department of
Education, the Department of Mental Hygiene, and the Division of Probation
to implement the terms of the Act. 26
Impact on the Current System
Essentially, the major changes wrought by the Act will be the possibility of
substituting a criminal prosecutor for the county attorney as counsel for the
petitioner; the detailed record-keeping at each stage of the proceeding; the
curtailment of the wide discretion now enjoyed by the Probation and Division
118. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(4)(c).
119. FCA § 760.
120. The Act § 19, adding FCA § 760(2).
121. FCA § 254 has up to now reflected the view that prosecutors had no place in Family
Court. Practice Commentary, supra note 44, at 185.
122. The Act § 27, amending N.Y. Exec. Law § 523 (McKinney 1972). as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
123. The Act § 21, adding FCA § 782-a. The Act § 26, amending N.Y. Exec. Law § 519(2)
(McKinney 1972) provides that copies of all probation reports and other relevant records be
delivered with the child or earlier to a person authorized by the Division for Youth to receive the
child. Originally, the law required only notification of the Division, and the delivery with the child
of the court order of adjudication and disposition. N.Y. Exec. Law § 519(2) (McKinney 1972).
124. The Act § 24, adding N.Y. Exec. Law § 515.
125. The Act § 25, amending N.Y. Exec. Law § 516 (McKinney 1972).
126. The Act § 29, adding N.Y. Educ. Law § 112; the Act § 30, amending N.Y. Mental
Hygiene Law § 7.05 (McKinney 1976). The heads of these departments are directed to prepare a
plan for presentation to the governor and the legislature before January 1, 1977. The Act § 31.
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for Youth personnel over the processing and disposition of juveniles accused of
serious violent crimes; and the imposition of continuity in judicial supervi-
sion. 127
Currently, many of the personnel involved in these processes, and the
techniques they use, are social-service, case-method oriented.1 28 As a result
they tend to focus primarily on the treatment needs of the child rather than on
punishment or the community's interest in protection. The altered purpose of
the law, which for the first time explicitly directs the consideration of the safety
of the community in any delinquency proceeding, will lend support to those
who favor severe treatment of serious offenders. Thus juveniles will probably
be treated more stringently. 129
Intake
The requirement that each case involving a DFA be prominently marked,
and that every subsequent action be committed to the record along with the
reasons for it, 130 virtually guarantees that the serious juvenile offender will not
slip unnoticed and unchallenged through the system. It should also promote
long and careful deliberation by intake and probation personnel because the
crucial decisions they make will now be on the record and, therefore, subject to
more detailed scrutiny by the court.
The near absolute discretion of Intake as to whether to file a petition will no
longer exist. Before "adjusting" a DFA case, the written approval of a judge of
the court must be obtained. 13' This automatically sets apart the more serious
cases, and further reduces the possibility that a violent offender will be
overlooked because of a heavy work load or an understaffed bureau.
Adjudication
Once the petition is filed, it must be prominently marked as a "designated
felony act petition. ' 132 This will force attention to the nature of the offense at
every subsequent step. The natural tendency to view the juvenile offender
sympathetically as a misguided child will be balanced with the constant
reminder that he is charged with such crimes as murder, rape, or arson.
The assignment of one judge to remain with a case through disposition,
where possible, 133 is a major shift from current practice, in which different
judges may preside at each stage. ' 34 The limit on adjournment of fact-finding
hearings 135 should mean quicker, more efficient processing of a case, improv-
127. See notes 58-71 supra and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of the usual social-service background of most personnel in the juvenile
justice system, see Johnson, supra note 19, at 56-57.
129. For a discussion of the possible effect of a child-oriented focus on decision-making, see
Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2, col. 3.
130. See text accompanying notes 83, 91, 96 supra.
131. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
132. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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ing the likelihood that all pertinent data and personnel will be available to aid
in more effective decisions. Where the district attorney becomes involved in a
DFA case, the result should be more effective prosecution, given his proficiency
with criminal cases. The district attorney's presence should also serve to
emphasize the serious nature of the offense. Taken as a whole, the Act's
provisions make only minor changes in the fact-finding process, but the overall
effect may be harder on the juvenile. 1 36 His needs will be balanced by the
community's need to be protected from him, and, in the less one-sided
hearing, 137 his advocates will have to offer more justification than formerly for
exoneration.
Disposition
Most of the Act's changes concern the dispositional hearing, the pre-
disposition reports, and the actual dispositions available.
Currently, the court's use of probation reports and assessments is fairly
common, but nothing in the law requires them. 138 When the FCA was passed,
there was still some controversy over how much of the information in the
reports should be made available to the respondent. Drafters of the FCA were
influenced by concern that a child could be damaged by knowledge of the
contents of psychological or other reports, and that relatives, teachers,
neighbors, and other sources of information might be reluctant to be quoted if
they knew the subject had access to the reports. 139 To prevent the reports from
becoming either a danger to the child or a meaningless superficiality, they left it
up to the court's discretion to decide-if such reports are used-how much
should be disclosed. 140 The Act expands this by providing that if reports are
made to the court, they shall be disclosed to the respondent. 14 ' If the court
wishes to keep some parts confidential, this fact must be disclosed and
explained. 142 If the respondent receives the reports, they must be made
available to counsel for the petitioner, 143 an aspect unmentioned in the FCA
heretofore. The new law still does not require the use of such reports in ordinary
delinquency cames.144 Since the same practical factors (lack of time, money and
personnel) that now inhibit the universal use of such reports 145 will still exist,
the frequency of use in non-DFA cases may or may not be affected by the
increased importance given them in DFA cases, where their use has been made
mandatory. In the latter situations, the Act, for the first time, not only requires
135. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
136. For evidence that delay in the past has been to the benefit of the juvenile, seeD Besharov,
Juvenile Justice Advocacy § 3.4.2 at 59 (1974).
137. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
138. See note 47 supra.
139. Dembitz-Cornell, supra note 29, at 516-17.
140. FCA § 746(b), repealed by the Act § 10.
141. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750(2).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Act § 13, adding §§ 750(1), (2).
145. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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the use of these tools, but also specifies what they must contain. 14 6 Moreover, it
recommends that expert opinion be obtained as to the risk posed by the
juvenile, 147 and mandates that all reports, and their makers, be available to
both respondent and petitioner. 1 48 This should result in more detailed investi-
gations and more thoughtful assessments, but will be subject to the same
limitations as currently apply1 49 unless additional funds and facilities are
supplied in order to provide for the quality of work that the law seems to
require.
A significant addition of the Act is the provision for input from counsel for
the petitioner by providing him with written notices of all dispositional
hearings and the opportunity to participate. He will now have the same
information as the judge and the right to present rebuttal evidence and offer
reappraisals of the availability and effectiveness of suggested dispositions
where necessary.150 The inclusion of projections as to the risk involved in any
disposition will offer opportunity to argue the safety of the community as a
compelling factor in any decision on requiring a restrictive placement.
This decision is the last major point of judicial discretion, since once it is
decided that such a placement is necessary, the actual disposition is mandated;
but the traditional flexibility and individualization of the juvenile justice
approach can still be maintained up to that point.
Sentencing has usually been individualized to the juvenile and his needs,
regardless of the offense. 15 1 Although the new law is aimed at limiting that
discretion where a serious violent offense is involved, the judge may still decide
that in a particular case restrictive placement is not required. 15 2 Although there
are criteria for this decision written into the law, 153 how much weight is given
to each will still be a matter of judicial discretion, allowing the judge to decide
against restrictive placement where circumstances have persuaded him that
lesser dispositions would be more appropriate. 5 4 The requirement of detailed
written justifications for every element of the decision may make for more
cautious decisions but should not overly inhibit judicial freedom to choose the
most effective disposition for the particular child.
Once restrictive placement is decreed, the broad control of the Division for
Youth over the actual implementation of any disposition is at an end.
Currently, despite the terms set by the Family Court, the Division can release
or transfer a juvenile from a secure or non-secure facility at any time without
146. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
147. The Act § 13, adding FCA § 750(3).
148. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
149. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 95 & 100 supra.
151. D. Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy §§ 12.1 et seq. (1975); Dembitz-Cornell, supra
note 29, at 502-03; National Probation and Parole Association, Guides for Juvenile Court Judges
71-72 (1957).
152. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(1).
153. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
154. The Act § 16, adding FCA § 753-a(1).
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having to consult or notify the court, or justify the action by showing that the
juvenile has been rehabilitated or the purpose of the disposition has been
achieved.15s This unreviewable discretion has been replaced with judicial
control of the terms, the setting, and the conditions of confinement. The court
must also be kept informed at regular intervals of the juvenile's progress and
must be involved in subsequent decisions to extend placement, discharge from
custody, or transfer to or from the Department of Mental Hygiene. 15 6 At the
very least this should bring about more carefully considered decisions whether
to release the violent juvenile into society. Whether these measures will succeed
in reducing violence and protecting society is another matter.
One of the oft-cited flaws in the current system is its inability to filter out the
minor offender from the serious criminal, and give the latter the special
handling his problems and offenses require.' 5 7 The currently available disposi-
tions offer little in the way of meaningful treatment for the offender or effective
protection for the community.' 58 Despite its reliance on the principle that
juveniles are incapable of criminal responsibility, and therefore all offenses are
really only the single one of "juvenile delinquency,"' 59 the law has recognized
that more "adult" crimes require special treatment. Thus, under the old law,
juveniles could be sentenced to prison for serious crimes.160 However, in the
entire state in 1973-74, only ten juveniles were so sentenced. 16' This may
reflect a reluctance to sentence children to adult criminal company, 62 or may
indicate problems with enforcing an adult sentence arrived at without a jury
trial. 163 It certainly does not reflect the true incidence of serious crime among
juveniles.164
The restrictive placement provisions of new section 753-a would seem to
impose at least a comparable length of confinement while avoiding those
factors that inhibited sentencing under the current section 758(b). Whether the
155. Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2, col. 1.
156. See notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text.
157. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 5-6.
158. See, e.g., Joint Report, supra note 64, at 22-24; Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 5;
Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 4, col. 3; N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, at 42, col. 3.
159. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra; A. Hechtman. Practice Commentary to N.Y.
Penal Law § 30.00 (McKinney 1975).
160. See note 51 supra.
161. Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 4, col. 4, n.9.
162. One of the overriding concerns of all juvenile reformers has been the mixing of young
offenders with older "hardened" criminals. See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra. Today this is
reflected in the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,
18 U.S.C. § 5039 (Supp. V 1975), for the segregation of serious criminal offense delinquents from
adult offenders.
163. Courts have been reluctant to enforce dispositions under the current provisions of FCA
§ 7580) that would commit a youth to the adult Department of Corrections when the adjudication
was made by ajudge alone. Rice v. Cory, 73 Misc. 2d 813, 342 N.YS.2d 510(Sup. Ct. 1973); In
re S., 77 Misc. 2d 194, 352 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Fam. Ct. 1974); contra, In re Garrett, 74 Misc. 2d 961,
346 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Farn. Ct. 1973).
164. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
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mandated minimum is sufficient is another issue. Advocates of an alternative
proposal165 argued for adult treatment of juveniles, based on the adult nature
of the offense, and the presumably greater penalties available in the adult
criminal code. ' 66
This is done in many other states either by excluding certain offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction, 167 or by allowing the court to waive its jurisdiction
in certain circumstances. 168 Transferring such cases to adult courts, whether it
be done through exclusion or waiver, 169 reflects a realization that chronological
age alone is no standard for measurement of the degree of danger represented
by certain offenders.' 70 One commentator has seen in this practice a basic
mistrust of the juvenile court's ability to handle serious young offenders and a
lack of commitment to the primacy of rehabilitation over punishment, at least
in regard to serious criminal offenders. 171
165 Hecht Bill, N.Y.A. 10340-A (1976). The bill's principal sponsor was Assemblyman
Burton G. Hecht.
166. For the views of Assemblyman Hecht, State Senators Donald M. Halperin and Ralph J.
Marino, see Treaster, Juvenile Criminals an Increasing Problem, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at
22, col. 3. For an argument that adult treatment will not result in longer sentences for juveniles, see
Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 4, col. 2. For an example of a situation where the Family Court
dealt more severely with a 14 year-old mugger than the adult court did with his 16 year-old
partner-in-crime, see N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, at 42, cols. 6-8.
167. In systems that use exclusion, anyone charged with the pertinent offenses, usually serious
violent crimes, is subject to the adult court. Md. Ann. Code tit. 3, § 804(d)(1), (4) (Supp. 1975); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 921(2Xa), 938 (1974); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 31-5-7-4.1(a)(1), 31-5-7-13 (Burns
Supp. 1976).
168. Under the waiver system, the juvenile court decides to turn the case over to the adult court
if conditions warrant it. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 702-7(3), (5) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1112(a)-(b) (Supp. 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.4 (Supp. 1976);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-60a (1975); N.J. Stat. Ann, § 2A:4-48 to -49 (Supp. 1976).
169. The waiver of jurisdiction has serious implications for the juvenile. In the juvenile court,
he is shielded from publicity, rarely jailed with adults, may be confined only to age 21, and does not
lose his civil rights. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that he is entitled to a waiver hearing. Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966). While the Kent court suggested extensive criteria for
deciding to waive jurisdiction, id. at 566-67, in general practice, most courts -eem to rely on the
seriousness of the offense and the past history of the juvenile. Davis, supra note 19, at 114.
Although New York does not use waiver, these criteria and the type of decisions called for-I.e., is
the offender amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile or does his nature and the nature
of his offense require more severe methods---are not unlike those called for in new FCA § 753-a.
In most states, the maximum jurisdictional age is 18 or higher, Davis, supra note 19, at 8, and
the transfer procedure presumably reflects the belief that older youths who commit serious crimes
are not appropriate candidates for juvenile treatment. Id. at 106. New York, with its uniquely low
age limit, Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 4, col. 1, accomplishes much the same result by the
Youthful Offender Law, whereby a youth over 16 is tried in adult court but, if granted Youthful
Offender status, receives many of the benefits of juvenile treatment. N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law §§ 720
et seq. (McKinney 1971), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
170. E.g., the view of State Senator Ralph J. Marino that "[t]he determination of maturity
should be based on the seriousness of the crime and not an artificial chronological age. A kid who
commits rape is not a child," in Treaster, Juvenile Criminals an Increasing Problem, N.Y.
Times, May 25, 1976, at 22, col. 3-4.
171. Davis, supra note 19, at 33-34.
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Referring juveniles to adult courts results in confining juveniles to adult
correctional facilities, a practice which is in general disfavor. It has been
recognized that placing "children with sophisticated adult offenders, and
the delinquent status which comes from familiarity with jail and adult
criminals tends to strengthen delinquent values and attitudes and thus increase
the likelihood of repeated delinquent offenses by the juveniles when re-
leased."1 72 One authgority on juvenile crime has expressed the view that a term
in adult prison would return to the streets an angrier, more hostile youth who
would pose an even greater threat to the community than before incarcera-
tion.173
New York, through the Act, has adopted a compromise. Although the
Family Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over those under sixteen, the
mandated minimum sentences do reflect the influence of proponents of longer
sentences and terms more directly related to the magnitude of the offense 74
and the concern of many juvenile authorities that confinement be of sufficient
length to allow efforts at rehabilitation a chance to work.175
In any case, the length of sentence may not be of as much importance as its
certainty. Unrealistically high sentences in past laws have often resulted in
"nullification" when courts refused to impose them. 17 6 When an offender can
judge that the risk of any real penalty is slight, the deterrent effect of high
"paper" penalties is lost. 17 7 Thus, the relatively short sentences of restrictive
placement-if imposed with consistency, and if applied with the full panoply of
rehabilitative techniques and the corrective measures that the Act directs the
Division for Youth and the State Departments of Education and Mental
Hygiene to employ"78-may prove effective against the violent juvenile.
CONCLUSION
In passing this Act,. the New York State legislature has acted under the
combined influence of great public pressure for protection from increasingly
violent youths, and the overwhelming evidence that the present system is
serving neither the youth nor the community. Demands for reform from
advocates of the mishandled youth have had to be reconciled with the
legitimate demands of a frightened public. It is noteworthy that even those
most committed to the cause of youth recognized the need for more effective
172. P. Habn, The Juvenile Offender and the Law 343 (1971).
173. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1976, at B5, col. 1.
174. See note 166 supra.
175. Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2; Joint Report, supra note 64, at 15-16. Other
authorities concur on the length of sentence prescribed. In its projected "blue print for reform" of
the juvenile justice system the Juvenile Justice Standards Project will recommend that dispositions
be made according to the gravity of the offense and the age and prior record of the individual,
rather than solely on the "needs" of the child; and that fixed terms of no more than two years be set
for juveniles. Kaufman, Of Juvenile Justice and Injustice, 62 A.B.A.J. 730, 732-33 (1976).
176. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, Fair and Certain
Punishment 15-18 (1976).
177. Id.
178. For an analysis of the support services needed in the view of one group that studied the
system, see Joint Report, supra note 64, at 22-24.
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measures of dealing with the violent youth. There still exists, however, a
fundamental divergence in viewpoint over the prime purpose of a juvenile
system. Is it to help and treat unfortunate youth, or is it to punish young
criminals? Thus one can speculate on whether this Act is a mere first step
toward increasingly harsher treatment of increasingly more vicious juvenile
criminals or a sop thrown by the "bleeding-hearts" to the "hard-liners" in hopes
of holding off further encroachment on the "socialized" ideal of the juvenile
system. The answers to these questions are difficult to determine since the Act
seems in large measure to be a compromise of these conflicting views. There is a
sense of reluctant acquiescence to be detected in the support given the Act by
some juveniles advocates, a feeling that if something must be lost to the more
militant view, this is the least noxious alternative. 179 Conversely, the advocates
of sterner measures seem to be taking a "wait and see" attitude before pressing
for further revision of the penalty provisions. 180
Viewed from the outside perspective of a potential crime victim, the penalties
of a two or three year "restrictive placement" will seem woefully inadequate
measured against the offenses of murder, rape, manslaughter, and kidnapping.
But viewed against the reality of the current operation, as revealed by the
legislative investigation'8 1 and the experience of those working in the juvenile
system,18 2 the structure and controls imposed by the Act have the potential for
major, meaningful improvements. The combination of those controls and a
mandatory penalty, even of relatively brief duration, should bring about
substantial improvements in the problem of the seriously violent juvenile.
Whether the Act can achieve its goal of satisfying the need for stronger
penalties without sacrificing the special nature of juvenile treatment, however,
will depend on how quickly it makes an observable impact on the juvenile
crime picture.
Margaret Holihan
179. Id. at 2-5.
180. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1976, at 48, cols. 5-8; interview with Andrew Schoenbeck,
legislative aide to Assemblyman Burton G. Hecht, June 29, 1976.
181. Gottfried Report, supra note 17, at 4-7.
182. Dembitz-N.Y.L.J., supra note 14, at 2; Guggenheim, supra note 13, at 4, cols. 2-5.
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